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BULLS, BEARS, AND RETIREMENT BEHAVIOR 
COURTNEY C. COILE and PHILLIP B. LEVINE* 
The authors examine the 
relationship between stock market performance 
and retirement behavior. They first present a descriptive analysis of the wealth 
holdings of older households and simulate the labor supply response among 
stockholders necessary to generate observed retirement patterns. Few house 
holds, they find, have substantial stock holdings, and these holdings would have 
to be extremely responsive to market fluctuations to explain observed labor 
force patterns. The authors then exploit stock market fluctuations since the 
early 1980s (particularly the boom and bust between 1995 and 2002), along with 
variation in stock exposure, to generate a double quasi-experiment, comparing 
the retirement and labor force re-entry patterns over time of those more and less 
exposed to the market. Any difference in behavior that emerged during the 
boom should have reversed itself during the bust. The authors find no evidence 
that changes in the stock market drove aggregate trends in labor supply. 
After 
posting record gains in the late 
1990s, the U.S. stock market dropped 
precipitously starting in the year 2000. In 
the twelve months following the market 
peak in March 2000, the benchmark S&P 
500 Index lost over one-quarter of its value 
and the NASDAQ Composite Index lost 
over 60% of its value; by October 2002, the 
S&P 500 had fallen by 50% from its peak 
and the NASDAQ had fallen by nearly 80%. 
This remarkable decline in stock value 
occurred at a time when more Americans 
were 
exposed to the stock market than ever 
before, often through participation in their 
pension plans. Friedberg and Webb (2003) 
*Courtney Coile is Assistant Professor and Phillip 
Levine is William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor, both at 
Wellesley College. The authors thank Wellesley Col 
lege for financial support and seminar participants at 
the National Bureau of Economic Research's Aging 
Workshop, UCLA Department of Economics, and the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for 
helpful comments. 
reported that 79% of full-time workers with 
pensions had a 401 (k) plan or other type of 
defined contribution plan in 1998, rising 
from 40% in 1983. Poterba (2001) found 
that 52% of households held some stock in 
1998, either through direct ownership of 
individual stocks or stock mutual funds or 
in their defined contribution plan or indi 
vidual retirement account (IRA), up from 
36% in 1989. As a result, it was widely 
predicted that the stock market drop would 
force many older workers to postpone re 
tirement.1 
Aggregate labor force statistics appear to 
offer some support for this hypothesis. 
Eschtruth and Gemus (2002) noted that 
The data and programs used to generate the re 
sults presented in this paper are available from the 
authors, for replication purposes, upon request. 
Contact the first author at ccoile@wellesley.edu. 
*For instance, in response to plummeting stock 
prices, the July 29, 2002 cover of Time Magazine asked, 
"Will You Ever Be Able to Retire?" 
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the two-percentage-point increase in labor 
force participation rate for older workers 
(aged 55 to 64) that occurred between early 
2000 and early 2002 was unprecedented in 
the United States since World War II and 
was particularly noteworthy for having oc 
curred during a recession, when labor force 
participation is typically flat or declining. 
They suggested that "plunging stock port 
folios may have caused some older workers 
to postpone retirement and convinced some 
early retirees to rejoin the labor force." 
However, there are reasons to be skepti 
cal that the drop in the stock market had 
much of an impact on aggregate labor force 
behavior. First, if the bear market led 
people to delay retirement, one might have 
predicted that the bull market in the late 
1990s would have led individuals to retire 
earlier. Yet data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics indicate that the labor force par 
ticipation rate for individuals 55 to 64 actu 
ally rose by about 2 percentage points dur 
ing the 1995 to 1999 boom years.2 More 
over, while considerably more workers have 
stock market holdings now than in the past, 
many workers may not yet have accumu 
lated large balances in these accounts and 
thus may be unlikely to respond to even a 
sizeable drop in the market. While indi 
vidual investors may have altered their re 
tirement plans, the ability of stock fluctua 
tions to drive aggregate labor force pat 
terns 
may be limited. 
In this paper, we examine the relation 
ship between stock market performance 
and retirement behavior over the past two 
decades, paying particular attention to the 
boom and bust periods of 1995-1999 and 
2000-2002, respectively. For our analysis, 
we use data from the first six waves (1992 
2002) of the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS), from the March 1981 to 2003 Cur 
2These data were accessed from the Bureau's cus 
tomized table-maker, available at data.bls.gov and 
accessed on July 5, 2004. Although this pattern may 
be partly attributable to the robust economy during 
the period, our own calculations (described below) 
show that even cyclically adjusted annual retirement 
rates were unaffected by the boom. 
rent Population Surveys (CPS), and from 
the 1992, 1995, and 1998 Surveys of Con 
sumer Finances (SCF). We first provide a 
descriptive analysis that begins by docu 
menting trends in retirement patterns us 
ing the CPS and HRS data. We also present 
descriptive statistics detailing the stock 
market holdings of older households in the 
late 1990s and then provide a "back-of-the 
envelope" calculation to simulate the mag 
nitude of the response to the recent stock 
market decline that would be required to 
generate the observed drop in retirement 
rates. Second, we undertake a reduced 
form analysis to compare the effect of the 
stock market on the retirement behavior of 
individuals who are likely to have been 
differentially affected by changes in the 
market, such as persons with and without 
defined contribution pension plans. Evi 
dence supporting an impact of the stock 
market on retirement behavior would re 
quire that those who are more likely to own 
stock are also more likely to retire in booms 
and less like to retire in busts. We also 
apply the same empirical strategy to an 
analysis of labor force re-entry decisions. 
This paper makes two important contri 
butions to the existing literature on the 
stock market and retirement. First, along 
with Kezdi and Sevak (2004), we are the 
first to look at both the boom period of the 
late 1990s and the bust period that fol 
lowed. But our 
methodology more directly 
imbeds these two periods into a quasi-ex 
perimental framework, taking advantage 
of what amounts to a double experiment in 
which differences across groups that are 
predicted to emerge during the boom are 
also predicted to reverse during the bust. 
Second, we focus on the aggregate response 
to market movements rather than estimate 
individual wealth effects. Our goal is to 
estimate the relationship between market 
fluctuations and aggregate changes in re 
tirement rather than the relationship be 
tween wealth and retirement. 
Literature Review 
Economic theory suggests that the con 
sumption of leisure, like the consumption 
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of other normal goods and services, should 
increase when the household experiences 
a positive wealth shock and, conversely, 
decrease when the household experiences 
a negative wealth shock. For households 
nearing retirement age, a positive (nega 
tive) wealth shock may lead family mem 
bers to retire earlier (later), especially if 
workers lack the flexibility to change the 
number of hours they work at their current 
job. Dramatic changes in stock market 
returns 
may generate shocks of this nature. 
Therefore, the broader literature on wealth 
shocks as well as those studies directly ex 
amining the role of stock market fluctua 
tions can inform this study. 
Recent research examining the role of 
wealth shocks more broadly has relied on 
sources of variation in retirement wealth 
that are exogenous to an individual's pref 
erences for leisure. Holtz-Eakinetal. (1993) 
and Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) used 
inheritances, Imbens et al. (2001) consid 
ered lottery winnings, and Krueger and 
Pischke (1992) took advantage of Social 
Security changes. Overall, this literature 
finds mixed support for the role of wealth 
shocks on retirement. 
A second related strand of the literature 
explores the impact on retirement deci 
sions of 
unexpected changes in wealth asso 
ciated with stock market fluctuations, such 
as the boom of the late 1990s. Coronado 
andPerozek (2003) andSevak (2001) both 
found a relationship between unexpected 
capital gains and retirement. But differ 
ences in unexpected gains are strongly (if 
not perfectly) correlated with previous dif 
ferences in the amount of stock ownership. 
These differences may be correlated with 
other unobservable characteristics, like in 
dividuals' preferences for leisure or their 
ability to plan for retirement. 
A third set of analyses has introduced 
quasi-experimental methods, examining 
whether retirement behavior responds dif 
ferently to market variation among those 
with more and less exposure to the stock 
market.3 Sevak (2001) found that men in 
3HurdandReti (2001) andHurdetal. (2005) used 
similar methods to examine the impact of market 
defined contribution (DC) pension plans 
increased their retirement rates by more 
than men in defined benefit (DB) pensions 
when the stock market was rising. Simi 
larly, Kezdi and Sevak (2004) found that 
retirement rates were lower for older work 
ers with dividend income (a proxy for stock 
market exposure) than for other workers 
in 2001 and 2002, when the market was 
falling, though their retirement rates were 
also lower during the late 1990s, when the 
market was rising. These studies are lim 
ited by sometimes poor measures of stock 
market exposure and an inability to cap 
ture on-going differences in trends between 
groups. Overall, the evidence for greater 
labor supply responses to changes in the 
stock market for those with more exposure 
to the market is far from conclusive.4 
Data and Empirical Strategy 
We use three different sources of data, 
each of which has distinct strengths and 
weaknesses that make it better suited for 
certain parts of the analysis. Where pos 
sible, each analysis is replicated using a 
second data source to confirm the results. 
The first data set is the Health and Re 
tirement Study (HRS). The HRS began in 
1992 as a longitudinal study of persons 
born between 1931 and 1941 and their 
spouses, with re-interviews of these 7,500 
fluctuations on the subjective probability of retire 
ment after age 62. They found no evidence that 
market fluctuations were more closely related to sub 
jective retirement probabilities for those who faced 
greater stock market exposure. 
4Other studies have also examined stock market 
fluctuations and retirement behavior using an ap 
proach whereby relevant elasticities are either taken 
from other studies or estimated within the framework 
of a structural retirement model and then used to 
predict responses to market fluctuations (Cheng and 
French 2003; Gustman and Steinmeier 2002). The 
labor supply responses to the stock market boom and 
bust estimated in these papers are quite large, on the 
order of 2 to 3 percentage points. However, the 
methodological approaches employed in these pa 
pers are sufficiently distinct from the one we apply in 
our 
analysis that we do not discuss them in further 
detail here. 
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households every two years; in 1998, addi 
tional birth cohorts were added to the sur 
vey so that it now includes persons born in 
all years through 1947. The HRS contains 
richly detailed information on demograph 
ics, labor supply, finances, and health. The 
principal advantage of the HRS is that it 
provides comprehensive data for a sample 
of 
near-retirement-age households and fol 
lows them over time. 
In this paper, we use two main compo 
nents of the HRS: information on retire 
ment behavior and on wealth holdings. For 
our 
analysis of retirement behavior, we use 
longitudinal data on wave 1 (1992) respon 
dents for the first six waves of the survey 
(1992-2002). In one part of that analysis, 
respondents contribute person-year obser 
vations for all years between 1992 and 2001 
in which they were aged 55 to 70, were 
working at the beginning of the calendar 
year, and had not previously retired; retire 
ment is defined as reporting a labor force 
status of retired or disabled by the end of 
the calendar year.5 In a second part of that 
analysis, we construct an analogous sample 
of person-month observations, making use 
of the availability of data on month of re 
tirement. We also present a descriptive 
analysis of household wealth holdings; we 
use wave 4 (1998) data for that analysis, 
because wave 4 is the last interview avail 
able prior to the stock market crash.6 In 
both the descriptive and retirement analy 
5The sample is constructed using HRS respon 
dents who were working at wave 1, so respondents 
who retired in 1992 prior to their interview are not in 
the sample. Persons who exited the labor force by 
other pathways (for example, exited to homemaker 
status, exited to other or no labor force status, or left 
the survey) did not provide a retirement date and 
thus are used in the sample only for the years in which 
it is known they worked the full year, and are omitted 
thereafter. Results are very similar if exits to disability 
are treated in the same manner. If persons reported 
multiple labor force status codes at one point in time, 
the following hierarchy is used: working, retired, 
disabled, all other. 
6We acknowledge that the values of these holdings 
immediately prior to the bust would likely be some 
what higher due to continued growth in the market 
through March 2000. 
ses, several variables are used to proxy for 
likely exposure to the stock market: educa 
tional attainment, ownership of a DC plan 
or IRA within the household, and owner 
ship of individual stocks or stock-based 
mutual funds.7 A designation of having 
"high value" DC and IRA or stock balances 
refers to having balances in excess of 
$50,000 in 2003 dollars. 
The Current Population Survey (CPS) is 
a 
monthly survey of approximately 50,000 
households and forms the basis for most 
published U.S. labor statistics; we use data 
from annual March CPS surveys from 1981 
to 2003, referencing behavior in 1980 
through 2002. The CPS includes about the 
same number of older households as the 
HRS, but it collects less information on 
them and does not follow the same house 
holds over time. CPS data, however, are 
available for a longer period of time, allow 
ing us to observe greater cyclical variability 
in the stock market to compare to retire 
ment behavior.8 The March surveys pro 
vide not only current labor market activity, 
but also retrospective reports from the past 
calendar year. From these data, we define 
a transition into retirement as occurring 
when an individual reports working at least 
7IRA and stock ownership status and asset values 
come from the RAND HRS data file, which imputes 
missing values using bracketed data (constructed 
based on questions such as whether respondents' 
accounts amounted to more or less than $10,000) and 
other information. Because asset allocation of DC 
balances is observed for only a small fraction of DC 
plans, DC plan participation is used as a proxy for 
stock market wealth in the analysis, though of course 
not all participants will invest their DC balances in 
stock. In the regression analysis, asset ownership is 
determined based on 
ownership at wave 1, so as to be 
exogenous to the subsequent boom and bust in the 
stock market. In the descriptive analysis, asset owner 
ship is based on ownership at wave 4, as the point of 
the exercise is to describe assets in the pre-crash 
period. 
8We also experimented with just using data from 
the 1990s onward to examine the sensitivity to changes 
in labor and financial markets. The results from this 
exercise were qualitatively similar to those reported 
here, but somewhat less precise, as one would expect 
with fewer observations. 
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13 weeks in the preceding calendar year, 
but he or she is currently out of the labor 
force on the survey date.9 Although data on 
the wealth holdings of CPS respondents are 
limited, we are able to use some informa 
tion on whether or not the individual was 
included in a pension plan (defined ben 
efit or defined contribution) and on that 
person's educational attainment to pro 
vide a rough proxy for stock holdings. 
The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) 
is a survey of about 4,500 households con 
ducted every three years to collect detailed 
data on the finances of U.S. households. 
Compared to the HRS, the SCF has more 
in-depth information on stock holdings. It 
provides no information that would enable 
us to detect retirement transitions, how 
ever, so these data can only contribute to 
our descriptive analysis of wealth holdings. 
In the analysis, data from the 1992, 1995, 
and 1998 SCF are pooled to generate sample 
sizes large enough to estimate descriptive 
statistics on the wealth holdings of older 
households and of subgroups of this popu 
lation. 
Our empirical analysis of the link be 
tween the stock market and retirement is 
divided into two parts: a descriptive analy 
sis and a reduced-form 
analysis. The goal 
of the descriptive analysis is to explore the 
plausibility of a large labor supply response 
to the recent drop in the stock market. 
First, we present detailed statistics on the 
wealth holdings of older households in the 
late 1990s to examine the level of stock 
market exposure in this population. Sec 
ond, we perform a "back-of-the-envelope" 
calculation to estimate the magnitude of 
the response to the stock market shock that 
would be necessary to explain the drop in 
the average retirement rate; this exercise is 
described in more detail below. 
In the reduced-form 
analysis, the empiri 
cal strategy is to compare the response to 
changes in the stock market among indi 
9Assuming those 13 weeks worked last year all took 
place in the first quarter, this definition is compa 
rable to an annual window in which retirements are 
observed between March of one year and of the next. 
viduals likely to have been differentially 
affected by such changes. The identifica 
tion of stock market effects relies on quasi 
experimental variation in exposure to the 
stock market, which comes from factors 
such as education level, participation in a 
defined contribution pension plan or IRA, 
and ownership of stocks or stock mutual 
funds. We hypothesize that if the stock 
market affects people's retirement behav 
ior, then the response to changes in the 
stock market should be larger among groups 
with greater exposure to the stock market. 
Importantly, any differential in retirement 
behavior across groups generated during 
the boom should be reversed during the 
bust. Findings to that effect in response to 
this double experiment would provide 
strong evidence of a causal effect of stock 
market fluctuations. 
Specifically, we estimate regressions of 
the form 
(1) Retire to = ?0 + ?jBusT^ + 
?9BooM + ?,X. + y + e.,, "2 t "S ist ' s ist7 
where Retire is a dummy variable for 
whether individual i residing in state/re 
gion s who worked in year t 
- 1 retires in 
year t, Bust and Boom are dummy variables 
for whether the person-year observation 
occurs in a bust year (2000-2001 in the 
HRS or 2000-2002 in the CPS) or a boom 
year (1995-99), and X is a set of demo 
graphic characteristics including exact age 
dummy variables, race and ethnicity, gen 
der, marital status, the unemployment rate 
(state-level in the CPS or region-level in the 
HRS), and state or regional fixed effects 
(y ). The sample is restricted to individuals 
working in year t 
- 1 and, in the HRS, to 
those workers who have not retired previ 
ously. Therefore, this model is very similar 
to a discrete time proportional hazard 
10Estimating models like equation ( 1 ) using a logit 
specification is equivalent to estimating a discrete 
time proportional hazard model (Allison 1984). We 
opt to estimate equation (1) as a linear probability 
model for ease of interpretation of the coefficients; 
the results using a logit specification are qualitatively 
similar. 
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model.10 This model is estimated first for 
all workers aged 55-70. But the true test of 
the impact of market fluctuations comes by 
estimating this model separately for groups 
who may be differentially affected by 
changes in the stock market and compar 
ing coefficients for the boom and bust pe 
riods across groups.11 
Estimation of equation (1) provides a 
way to identify whether there is a relation 
ship between the stock market and retire 
ment, but does not determine the magni 
tude of the impact of market fluctuations 
on retirement behavior. To do so, we esti 
mate a second set of regressions of the form 
(2) Retire^ = ?0 + ?jASoTOOO^ 
where AS&P500 is the percentage change 
in the S&P 500 Index over the previous 
twelve months. As before, the model is 
estimated for all workers and separately for 
groups of workers likely to have been differ 
entially affected by changes in the stock 
market. Note that the identification strat 
egy is similar to that underlying equation 
(1), but this analysis allows for the effect to 
be parameterized. 
Finally, we explore the effect of stock 
market fluctuations on the decision to re 
enter the labor force following retirement, 
as this may also constitute an important 
labor supply response to changes in the 
market. Specifically, we re-estimate equa 
tions (1) and (2) using labor force re-entry 
as the dependent variable. In the CPS, 
labor force re-entry is defined as working 
on the survey date conditional on having 
worked fewer than 13 weeks in the previous 
year. In the HRS, labor force re-entry is 
defined as working at the current wave of 
the survey conditional on having been out 
of the labor force at the last wave.12 We 
hypothesize that if the market affects re 
11 We choose to estimate the model separately by 
group rather than interact the group dummy variable 
with the boom and bust dummies in order to allow the 
other covariates, notably the age dummies, to differ 
by group. 
12The HRS labor force re-entry analysis is based on 
a 
sample of person-wave observations. Creating a 
entry decisions, then those with greater 
exposure to the market will be relatively 
less likely to re-enter the labor force during 
the boom period and relatively more likely 
to do so during the bust period. 
Descriptive Analysis 
We begin our analysis by offering data 
from the CPS and HRS in Figure 1, which 
tracks 
changes in retirement patterns over 
time for workers ages 60-65. Since the size 
of an age cohort changes over time and 
since the economy moved from a substan 
tial expansion in the late 1990s to a period 
of recession and weak growth in the begin 
ning of the current decade, we use the 
available data to generate retirement rates 
adjusted for age composition and business 
cycle conditions over time.13 Results from 
both surveys are consistent with the statis 
tics reported in Eschtruth and Gemus 
(2002) in showing that retirement rates 
took a noticeable and statistically signifi 
cant drop exactly in 2000, which corre 
sponds with the plunge in the stock mar 
ket.14 In both datasets, despite the differ 
person-year sample for this analysis is not feasible, 
because the date of labor force re-entry is either 
missing or inconsistent (for example, the respondent 
reports starting the current job in 1995 but previously 
reported being out of the labor force in 1996) for 
about half of all re-entrants. In this analysis, the 
boom period includes labor force transitions between 
waves 3 and 4 and waves 4 and 5 (1996-1998, 1998 
2000) and the bust period includes transitions be 
tween waves 5 and 6 (2000-2002). 
13These estimates are obtained from regression 
models of the "retirement rate" (whose definition 
differs in the two surveys) on state-level (in the CPS) 
and region-level (in the HRS) unemployment rates, 
exact age dummies, and year fixed effects (and no 
constant); reported results reflect the year fixed ef 
fects assuming a 5% unemployment rate and an equal 
share of workers ages 60-65. In the CPS, year labels 
are associated with the survey conducted in March of 
the following year, since most of the retirement that 
is captured in that survey is likely to reflect behavior 
that occurred last year, as described above. All HRS 
figures begin in 1993, as the sample is constructed 
using wave 1 workers (see above) and does not cap 
ture all retirements in 1992. 
14Alternatively, the drop in retirement rates in 
2000 could have been merely the realization of a 
longer-term decline in retirement among older work 
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Figure I. Adjusted Retirement Rates for Workers 60 to 65. 
0.17 
Note: Definitions of retirement are not consistent between CPS and HRS (see text for details). Rates reflect retirement 
behavior adjusted for variation in the unemployment rate and the exact age composition of 60-to-65 year-olds. The 
estimates assume an unemployment rate of 5% and are measured at the average retirement hazard between age 60 and 65. 
In the CPS, year t reflects retirements that take place roughly between March of year t and March of year / + 1. 
enees in the definition of retirement tran 
sitions, older workers appear to have re 
duced their likelihood of retiring by about 
two percentage points during the market 
bust. 
As previewed earlier, however, there are 
reasons to be 
skeptical of a causal relation 
ship between recent market performance 
and retirement even based on this prelimi 
nary analysis. First, the change in the re 
tirement rate in 2000 is quite large, espe 
cially considering the timing of the market 
decline. Although the S&P 500 peaked for 
ers (see Burtless and Quinn 2002). A second possibil 
ity is that changes in Social Security rules, including 
the increase in the Normal Retirement Age for work 
ers 
reaching age 62 in the year 2000 or later and the 
elimination of the earnings test for workers age 65 
and above starting in 2000, affected retirement be 
havior. 
the year on March 24 at 1,527 and declined 
to 1,320 by the end of the year (a 14% 
decline), on September 1, the value stood 
at 1,521. This means that there should have 
been little or no retirement response in the 
first three quarters of that year. Although 
the argument is not quite as strong with the 
NASDAQ, which hit its annual peak of 5,049 
on March 10 and fell to 2,471 by the end of 
the year (a 51% decline), the market's in 
dex stood at 4,234 as late as September 1. 
This also suggests that much of the re 
sponse had to take place late in the year and 
must have 
represented a very large change 
in behavior over a very short period of time. 
Second, the CPS data provide little evi 
dence of a 
symmetric response to the boom 
ing stock market of the late 1990s. Cycli 
cally adjusted retirement rates between 1995 
and 1999 were actually lower over that pe 
riod than they had been previously despite 
the greater wealth generated by exceptional 
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stock market returns. However, other time 
varying factors may confound this simple 
analysis of the effect of the stock market on 
retirement, so this evidence, while infor 
mative, is far from conclusive. 
The fact that most older households have 
only limited stock holdings also suggests 
that market fluctuations may not have a 
sizeable effect on aggregate labor market 
behavior.15 The nature of these holdings is 
reported in Tables 1A and IB, using data 
from the HRS and SCF, respectively. Statis 
tics reflect the holdings of workers nearing 
retirement age (55 to 60). Data from the 
1998 HRS and from the 1992, 1995, and 
1998 SCF are employed to assess holdings 
prior to the stock market plunge in early 
2000.16 
In the HRS (Table 1 A), over two-thirds 
of older households had retirement ac 
counts at the time of the survey?46% of 
households had one or more members with 
a defined contribution (DC) pension plan, 
47% of households had an IRA, and 68% of 
households had one or both types of retire 
ment account. Yet it is important to keep in 
mind that these accounts were not neces 
sarily invested entirely, or even mainly, in 
stocks; older households making more con 
servative investments based on their age 
may have reduced their holdings in stock 
based investments because of their riskier 
nature. Ownership of individual stocks or 
stock mutual funds outside of retirement 
accounts was less prevalent but still consid 
erable, with 38% of households owning 
these assets. Overall, 75% of families had 
some type of account (DC pension, IRA, or 
stocks) that may have included stock hold 
15Engen et al. (2004) made a similar point regard 
ing the impact of stock market fluctuations on the 
adequacy of retirement savings, stating that "because 
most stocks are held by households with substantial 
wealth, and most households hold very little equity, 
fluctuations in stock market values ... have little effect 
on households' ability to save adequately for retire 
ment." 
16We have also relaxed the sample restrictions 
placed on the analysis performed here and verified 
that we can 
replicate official SCF results on wealth 
holdings, published in Kennickel et al. (2000). 
ings, although this statistic is also likely to 
overstate 
exposure to the stock market. 
Median assets values in these accounts 
were high by historical standards, but still 
low relative to family income. Among house 
holds holding each type of asset, median 
holdings in DC accounts and IRAs were 
about $40,000 each, while median stock 
holdings were $33,900. Among households 
with any of these three accounts, median 
combined holdings were $68,900. This 
represents less than one and a half times 
the median income, which was $48,728 (in 
2003 dollars) for households aged 55 to 64 
in 1998 (U.S. Census Bureau 1999). 
Moving across Table 1 A, it is evident that 
the distribution of these assets was highly 
skewed. While 68% of families owned a DC 
plan or IRA, only 28% of families had com 
bined balances of over $50,000 in these 
assets, and median combined holdings for 
this subset of families were $208,800. Simi 
larly, only 17% of families had holdings of 
stocks in excess of $50,000; median com 
bined holdings for these families were 
$311,600. Asset holdings also varied greatly 
by education level?89% of college-edu 
cated households had some type of account 
that may have included stocks, but only 
52% of high school dropout households 
did. The median combined holdings were 
$146,700 for college-educated households 
compared to $20,300 for high school drop 
out households. These differences in stock 
holdings are an important component of 
our 
quasi-experimental methodology. 
Table IB replicates these statistics using 
the SCF. The SCF statistics are broadly 
similar to those in Table 1 A, though owner 
ship of DC pensions and stocks is less preva 
lent and asset values are somewhat lower, as 
one would expect given the pooling of data 
with earlier years. Yet the SCF data have the 
advantage of including better information 
on whether DC pension and IRA assets 
were invested in stock. Figure 2 illustrates 
that the fraction of households reporting 
that their DC plan or IRA was invested 
mostly in stocks was consistently less than 
50%. This was also true for IRA plans as 
reported in the HRS. When DC pension 
and IRA assets are counted only if invested 
Table 1A. Stock-Related Financial Holdings of Workers Age 55 to 60 in the 1998 Health and Retirement Study. OS 
Type of Holding 
No Has 
"High Value" No Stocks Has "High Value" 
DC DC DC or Stock Stocks or Stocks or High High 
All Pension Pension Pension/ Mutual Stock-Based Stock School School Some 
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Notes: The sample is restricted to households in which the respondent or spouse is between age 55 and 60 and is employed on the survey date. "High value" 
is defined as having at least a $50,000 combined balance in a defined contribution pension plan and IRA account or in stocks and stock-based mutual funds. 
























Table IB. Stock-Related Financial Holdings of Workers Age 55 to 60 in the 1992, 1995, and 1998 Surveys of Consumer Finances. 




"High Value" No Stocks 
DC DC DC or Stock 
Pension Pension Pension/ Mutual 
or IRA or IRA IRA Fund 
Has 
"High Value" 
Stocks or Stocks or High High 
Stock-Based Stock School School Some 




Stocks/Stock Funds 33.3 
DC Pension 40.6 
DC Pension (mostly in stocks) 15.0 
IRA 47.5 
IRA (mostly in stocks) 20.8 
Any Types 71.9 
Any Stock-Based Types 47.5 
Stocks/Stock Funds 26.6 
DC Pension 30.2 
DC Pension (mostly in stocks) 22.6 
IRA 30.2 
IRA (mostly in stocks) 34.4 
All Types 46.1 
All Stock-Based Types 42.9 
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Notes: The sample is restricted to households in which the respondent or spouse is between age 55 and 60 and is employed on the survey date. Sampling 
weights are used to provide nationally representative statistics for this group. "High value" is defined as having at least a $50,000 combined balance in a defined 
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Figure 2. Investment Allocation in IRAs and Defined 
Contribution Pensions. 
Mostly Stocks | Mostly Interest-Bearing 
| Combination [_| Other 
DC Plan IRA IRA 
(SCF) (SCF) (HRS) 
mostly in stock, both the fraction of house 
holds holding each type of asset and the 
median value of assets decrease 
signifi 
cantly. While 41% of households had DC 
pensions, only 15% had pensions invested 
mostly in stocks; for IRAs, the equivalent 
figures are 48% and 21%, respectively. 
Overall, only 48% of households had any 
assets invested 
mostly in stock, and the 
median value of such assets among these 
households was $42,900, which is less than 
the 1998 median household income for 
this age group (in 2003 dollars). 
The key point from these descriptive 
statistics is that the labor supply response to 
the drop in the stock market in 2000 is 
unlikely to have come from the median 
person. Fewer than half of older house 
holds had any assets invested mostly or 
wholly in stock, and median asset holdings 
for households that did were on the order 
of one year of household income. It seems 
unlikely that even a sizeable decrease in the 
value of these assets would have generated 
a large labor supply response. 
To 
explore this point further, we con 
duct a 
"back-of-the-envelope" calculation 
to estimate the magnitude of the response 
to the 2000 stock market shock that would 
be necessary to explain the observed drop 
in the average retirement rate; the results 
of this analysis are shown in Table 2. We 
first restrict the sample of HRS respon 
dents to those who were aged 55 to 70 and 
working at the beginning of 2000. Then we 
categorize these workers according to the 
value of their stock assets at that time, where 
the categories include those with any assets 
and (among workers with assets) those with 
at least $25,000, $50,000, $100,000, and 
$250,000 in stock assets. Where assump 
tions are 
required to value stocks, we do so 
in a way that is likely to overvalue them.17 
Finally, we calculate the monthly annuitized 
value of the loss incurred in a portfolio of 
each of these amounts as a result of the 
stock market drop during 2000. For ex 
ample, a portfolio invested 70% in the S&P 
500 Index and 30% in the NASDAQ (the 
approximate relative market capitalization 
of the two indices at the end of 1999) would 
have dropped 25% between the market 
peak in March 2000 and the end of the year, 
resulting in a $6,250 loss on a $25,000 port 
folio; this is equivalent to a $41 decrease in 
monthly income if annuitized at a 5% real 
interest rate over 20 years.18 
17The HRS has information on how IRAs are in 
vested ("mostly in stock, mostly in interest-earning 
assets, or about evenly split") but collects such infor 
mation for only a minority of DC plans, so this infor 
mation was not used in Table 1A. Here, we assume 
that "invested mostly in stock" means 100% in stock, 
"mostly in interest-earning assets" means 1 /3 in stock, 
and 
"evenly split" means 2/3 in stock. For people with 
missing DC or IRA asset allocation, we assign the 
mean stock percentage in this asset class for their 
education group. For a small number of people with 
missing DC asset values, we assign the median value 
for their education group. Asset values are those 
reported in the 1998 HRS, increased to the year 2000 
level using the asset returns between the wave 4 
interview date and March 2000 for a portfolio of 
which 70% is invested in the S&P 500 and 30% in the 
NASDAQ; values are then adjusted to 2003 dollars 
using the CPI. 
18As one way to benchmark the magnitude of such 
a drop in assets, we note that Code et al. (2002) 
estimated that a typical one-earner couple forgoes 
$8,160 (in 2003 dollars) in Social Security wealth by 
claiming at age 62 rather than at the optimal age of 
65; although the authors estimated that delaying 
benefit claims would produce substantial benefits in 
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Table 2. Simulated Retirement Rates for Those Aged 55 to 70 
Holding Stocks Required to Match Observed Retirement Rates. 
Stock Assets at Beginning 
of 2000 (in 2003 dollars) * Xa 
Description X?0 25K 50K 100K 250K 
1) Monthly annuitized value of loss associated with 
stock market decline in 2000 at Xb $0 $41 $82 $164 $409 
2) Percentage of HRS sample with stock assets :> X 67.8 48.8 39.5 31.0 8.2 
3) Percentage of HRS sample with stock assets < X 32.3 51.2 60.5 69.0 81.8 
4) Predicted 2000 retirement rate for those with 
stock assets < Xe 12.1 12.3 12.3 12.1 12.2 
5) Predicted 2000 retirement rate for those with 
stock assets ^ X and no response to stock market 
decline0 12.8 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.4 
6) Simulated retirement rate for those with stock 
assets 2sX.d 7-0 5.3 3.6 1.1 -6.5 
aEach column of this table represents the characteristics of the sample whose stock market values at the 
beginning of 2000 are above or below the defined level. See footnotes in text for greater detail regarding the 
construction of these values. 
bThe 2000 market decline is calculated as a weighted average of the decline in the S&P 500 (70% weight) and 
the NASDAQ (30% weight), where the weights are determined according to the relative market values of the 
two indices at the end of 1999. 
Predicted retirement rates represent the rates that would have been expected based on labor market 
conditions and the demographic characteristics (age, race/ethnicity, gender, region, and marital status) of the 
sample of respondents still working at the beginning of 2000. These predictions are obtained from regression 
models of retirement behavior using 1992-1999 HRS data. 
dThose with stock market assets below the lower bound are assumed to be unaffected by the market decline. 
The simulated retirement rate for those with stock assets at or above the cut-off is calculated to be the value 
necessary for the weighted average of the predicted rate for those below the cut-off and the simulated rate for 
those above the cut-off to match the aggregate rate observed in the 2000 HRS of 8.9%. 
We use these values to help determine 
which individuals would likely have re 
sponded to the stock market crash. Clearly, 
workers with no stock assets should not 
have responded, since they lost nothing. 
Workers under the $25,000 cutoff were also 
unlikely to respond, as they faced a maxi 
mum annuitized loss of just $41 per month. 
Using this logic, it seems reasonable that 
workers with stock assets up to perhaps 
$100,000 (and even beyond) may not have 
a wide variety of cases, they found that very few 
workers delayed. One possible explanation is that 
people are overly sensitive to seeing "cash on the 
table"; if this is the case, then it is possible that 
workers would respond to even relatively small de 
creases in stock assets. 
responded, as they faced an annuitized loss 
of no more than $164 per month.19 
Next, we estimate a retirement regres 
sion model using 1992-99 HRS data and 
use it to predict retirement probabilities in 
the year 2000 if the stock market was un 
changed.20 Finally, using these predicted 
19In 2002, mean annual expenditures for house 
holds headed by an individual between ages 65 and 74 
were $32,243, or $2,687 per month (U.S. Department 
of Labor 2004). For such a household, $164 would 
represent about 6% of spending. This percentage 
would likely be somewhat higher for the median 
household, but median consumption statistics are 
not provided in this report. 
20The regression includes the unemployment rate 
and various demographic characteristics (age dum 
mies, race/ethnicity, gender, region, and marital sta 
tus). 
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Figure 3. Adjusted Retirement Rates for Workers 60 to 65 in the Health and Retirement 
Survey, by Defined Contribution Pension/IRA Status. 
2001 
Notes: Rates reflect retirement behavior adjusted for variation in the unemployment rate and the exact age 
composition of 60 to 65 year olds. The estimates assume an unemployment rate of 5% and are measured at the average 
retirement hazard between age 60 and 65. 
probabilities for the households below each 
asset cutoff point, we calculate what the 
average retirement rate would have to have 
been among those above the cutoff in or 
der to generate a weighted average retire 
ment rate 
matching that actually observed 
in the sample in the year 2000, 8.9%.21 For 
the most conservative 
assumption that only 
those without stocks failed to respond to 
the market crash, we estimate that the aver 
age retirement rate in the rest of the sample 
would have needed to drop from the pre 
dicted level of 12.8% to 7.0%. Under the 
alternative assumption that individuals in 
households with up to $25,000, $50,000, or 
even $100,000 would not have responded, 
the 
required retirement rate among those 
above the cutoff falls to 5.3%, 3.6%, and 
21Note that this statistic is smaller than that dis 
played in Figure 1, largely because the sample used 
here includes workers 55 to 70 compared to a sample 
of those 60 to 65 in Figure 1. 
1.1%, respectively. Using the $100,000 cut 
off, it would need to have been the case that 
virtually no one with more than $ 100,000 in 
stock assets retired during the year 2000 for 
the observed drop in the retirement rate to 
be due to the stock market crash, which 
seems highly implausible. The superficial 
plausibility falls even more when one rec 
ognizes that the change in retirement be 
havior was unlikely to have begun until 
later in 2000 based on the monthly move 
ments in market indices, as described ear 
lier. If the asset cut-off is defined to be 
$250,000, it is actually impossible to simu 
late the observed behavior. Overall, this 
simulation shows that the response to the 
2000 stock market decline had to have been 
extremely strong (and possibly implausible 
or even impossible) to explain the observed 
drop-off in retirement rates.22 
22Alternatively, it is possible that workers with rela 
tively little stock market wealth were "irrationally 
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Figure 4. Adjusted Retirement Rates for Workers 60 to 65 in the Health and Retirement Survey, 
by Stock Holdings Status. 
2001 
Notes: Rates reflect retirement behavior adjusted for variation in the unemployment rate and the exact age 
composition of 60 to 65 year olds. The estimates assume an unemployment rate of 5% and are measured at the average 
retirement hazard between age 60 and 65. 
Regression Results 
Retirement 
Before describing the regression results 
in detail, we provide two graphical examples 
that preview those results. Figure 3 uses 
HRS data and distinguishes individuals with 
no DC plan or IRA, those with a DC plan or 
IRA, and those with DC and IRA combined 
balances in excess of $50,000. The figure 
compares cyclically adjusted retirement 
behavior over time for workers between the 
depressed" (the opposite of irrationally exuberant? 
thanks to Dan Hamermesh for the terminology), and 
would choose to work longer despite the small impact 
on their retirement income in response to the falling 
stock market. Although we have no way to disprove 
this hypothesis, one would presume that the impact 
would be greater for workers with more stock market 
exposure even in the face of irrational depression. 
We take up the differential responsiveness in the 
following section. 
ages of 60 and 65. All experienced identi 
cal drops in retirement between 1999 and 
2000. Individuals with high-value DC and 
IRA balances did have much higher retire 
ment rates in 1996-98, but that differential 
disappeared in 1999. Moreover, it is not 
clear whether this was a response to the 
boom or simply a difference in the under 
lying propensity to retire, as the retirement 
rate was higher for those with a pension or 
IRA in the pre-boom period as well. 
Figure 4 provides another example, us 
ing HRS data and comparing retirement 
rates by an even more direct measure of 
stock market exposure, whether the house 
hold owned individual stocks or stock mu 
tual funds. The expected larger response 
to the stock market drop by those exposed 
to the market 
again fails to materialize?in 
fact, the drop in the retirement rate be 
tween 1999 and 2000 was larger for indi 
viduals with no stock than for individuals 
with any stock or with stock holdings in 
excess of $50,000. The high-value stock 






































































































































































Notes: The HRS sample of person-year observations includes all Wave 1 respondents in all years (from 1992 to 2001) in which they were between the ages 
of 55 and 70, were working at the beginning of the calendar year, and had not previously retired. Participation in DC pension plan, IRA, or stocks is based 
on ownership of these assets at Wave 1; "high value" indicates Wave 1 assets of $50,000 or more (in 2003 dollars). Regressions also include controls for race, 
ethnicity, exact age dummy variables, marital status, gender, regional unemployment rates, and region-specific fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered 
at the household level to correct for arbitrary forms of serial correlation in the error term across individuals within the same household over time. The CPS 
sample includes all respondents between the ages of 55 and 70 who worked at least 13 weeks in the preceding calendar year. Regressions also include controls 
for race, ethnicity, exact age dummy variables, marital status, gender, the state unemployment rate, period dummy variables before 1992, and state-specific 
fixed effects. In all specifications, the omitted base period is 1992-94. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are multiplied by 100. 
Source: Authors' calculations from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the Current Population Survey (CPS). 
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group had a higher retirement rate in 1997 
during the boom, but not during the rest of 
that period, and also had a higher rate in 
1994 before the boom. Overall, the figures 
provide no support for the hypothesis that 
workers who were more likely to be affected 
by the drop in the stock market in 2000 
reduced their retirement relative to other 
workers and inconsistent support at best 
for the hypothesis that these workers in 
creased their retirement rate in the boom 
period of the late 1990s.23 
The regression analysis formalizes the 
results in these figures in a framework that 
also controls for demographic characteris 
tics, the unemployment rate, and state- or 
region-specific fixed effects. Table 3 re 
ports the linear probability model estimates 
of equation ( 1 ) for the workers in the HRS 
(top panel of the table) and the CPS (bot 
tom panel) ,24 The first column largely pre 
sents a parameterized version of the pat 
terns presented in Figure 1, where years 
have been aggregated into periods, demo 
graphic controls are included, and we use a 
sample of workers who are 55 to 70 rather 
than 60 to 65 to improve precision. Consis 
tent with that figure, we see that retirement 
rates fell during the bust period (2000 
2002) relative to the baseline (1992-94), 
but did not rise during the boom period 
(1995-99). 
More interesting for our purposes is the 
comparison of the boom and bust coeffi 
cients across columns in the rest of the 
table. As in the figures, we examine whether 
23We also have conducted analogous exercises 
comparing workers with different levels of educa 
tional attainment in both the CPS and the HRS and 
comparing workers by pension status in the CPS. In 
no case do we see any support for the hypothesis that 
the groups more likely to be exposed to stock market 
fluctuations were more (less) likely to retire in the 
boom (bust). 
24In the CPS regressions, standard errors are clus 
tered at the year level to correct for arbitrary forms of 
serial correlation in the error term across individuals 
within the same survey year. In all HRS regressions, 
standard errors are clustered at the household level 
to correct for arbitrary forms of serial correlation in 
the error term across individuals within the same 
household over time. 
the retirement rate fell by more in the bust 
period and whether it rose by more (or fell 
by less) relative to the omitted period for 
groups with greater exposure to the stock 
market. We find no evidence to support 
this hypothesis. For example, in the HRS 
the retirement rate in the bust period was 
5.0 percentage points lower than in the 
early 1990s for those who did not own stocks, 
compared to 3.5 percentage points lower 
for those who did own stocks and 4.6 
percentage points lower for the subset of 
those with greater than $50,000 in stock 
assets. These estimates are not statisti 
cally significantly different from each 
other. In the case of a DC plan or IRA, 
the retirement rate was 3.7 percentage 
points lower for individuals without such 
assets compared to 5.2 percentage points 
lower for individuals with $50,000 or more 
in such assets, but the difference is not 
statistically significant. The remainder 
of the table provides similar results by 
pension status in the CPS and by educa 
tion status in both datasets. Overall, we 
find no evidence in either the CPS or 
HRS regressions that workers with greater 
exposure to the stock market reduced 
their retirement rate during the bust 
period relative to other workers. The 
results provided in this table also do not 
support the notion that those with greater 
exposure were more likely to retire when 
the market was doing well.25 
25Our results can be easily reconciled with Sevak 
(2001), who found statistically significant effects of 
unanticipated stock market gains on retirement but 
projected that the gains experienced in the late 1990s 
had only a very minor effect on aggregate retirement 
behavior. As she noted, "Although the data find quite 
large wealth effects, because many individuals have 
negligible wealth gains over the period, the aggregate 
effect is quite small." Our results are somewhat less 
consistent with Coronado and Perozek (2003), who 
found that being a stockholder was associated with 
retiring earlier than expected in the late 1990s, rela 
tive to non-stockholders. Yet Kezdi and Sevak (2004) 
found that stockholders also retired earlier than non 
stockholders in the 2000-2002 bust period, suggest 
ing that differences in behavior could in part reflect 
unobserved heterogeneity between stockholders and 
non-stockholders. 
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Notes: The HRS sample of person-month observations includes all Wave 1 respondents in all months (from 1992 to 2001) in which they were between the 
ages of 55 and 70, were working at the beginning of the calendar year, and had not previously retired. Participation in DC pension plan, IRA, or stocks is based 
on ownership of these assets at Wave 1; "high value" indicates Wave 1 assets of $50,000 or more (in 2003 dollars). Regressions also include controls for race, 
ethnicity, exact age dummy variables, marital status, gender, regional unemployment rates, and region-specific fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered 
at the household level to correct for arbitrary forms of serial correlation in the error term across individuals within the same household over time. The CPS 
sample includes all respondents between the ages of 55 and 70 who worked at least 13 weeks in the preceding calendar year. Regressions also include controls 
for race, ethnicity, exact age dummy variables, marital status, gender, state unemployment rates, and state-specific fixed effects. Coefficients and standard 
errors (in parentheses) are multiplied by 100. 
Source: Authors' calculations from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and Current Population Survey (CPS). 
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Table 4 presents the linear probability 
model estimates of equation (2), which 
quantifies the relationship between the 
stock market and retirement. The key ex 
planatory variable in this specification is 
the percentage change in the S&P 500 In 
dex over the previous twelve months.26 The 
coefficient on this variable is expected to 
be positive, as workers should be more likely 
to retire when the stock market rises due to 
wealth effects. In the HRS, the availability 
of month of retirement in the data allows 
the analysis to be conducted using person 
month observations. Therefore, estimates 
based on the HRS should be smaller than 
those from the CPS, since we are compar 
ing the effect of a given change in the S&P 
500 Index on 
monthly versus annual retire 
ment rates.27 In the HRS, a 10% rise in the 
S&P is associated with a 0.066 increase in 
the monthly retirement rate for all work 
ers; the effect is statistically significant. In 
the full CPS sample, a 10% rise in the S&P 
500 is associated with a 0.10 percentage 
point increase in the annual retirement 
rate, although the effect is not statistically 
significant. 
As in the earlier tables, our primary in 
terest is in testing whether this effect was 
larger for workers who were more likely to 
be exposed to the stock market, and once 
again, the results do not support this hy 
pothesis. Comparing this coefficient across 
groups, there is no evidence that groups 
with greater stock market exposure were 
more 
responsive to change in the S&P. For 
example, in the HRS a 10% rise in the S&P 
is associated with a 0.059 percentage point 
increase in the monthly retirement rate for 
workers with no DC plan or IRA, compared 
to 0.072 for all workers with such assets and 
0.088 for workers with balances of $50,000 
26In the HRS, results are qualitatively similar when 
the key variable is defined as the percentage change 
in the S&P Index over the previous two or three years, 
though statistically insignificant when defined as the 
percentage change over the previous five years. 
27When the HRS analysis is conducted using a 
person-year sample, the magnitude of the coefficients 
is similar to those in the CPS. 
or more in such assets, but these differ 
ences are small and not statistically signifi 
cant. The results are even more 
striking in 
the case of stock ownership?the S&P coef 
ficients for workers with and without stock 
are identical, and the coefficient for those 
with stock assets of $50,000 or more is half 
as large as that for workers with no stock, 
although the difference is not statistically 
significant. Patterns by educational status 
in both data sources and by pension status 
in the CPS similarly do not support the 
hypothesis that the sensitivity of retirement 
behavior to market returns increases with 
stock market 
exposure.28 
Labor Force Re-Entry 
Finally, we examine the effect of market 
fluctuations on labor force re-entry. The 
effect is expected to be the opposite ofthat 
predicted for retirement: workers should 
be less likely to re-enter during a stock 
market boom and more likely to do so 
during a bust, and the effect should again 
be larger for those with greater stock mar 
ket exposure. Here we report the results of 
linear probability models of labor force re 
entry comparable to those reported in Table 
4, where the key explanatory variable in 
this specification is the percentage change 
in the S&P 500 Index over the previous 
twelve months.29 For reference, the aver 
28In order to test the sensitivity of our results to the 
choice of retirement definition, we have replicated 
Table 4 using two other dependent variables, retire 
ment based on self-reported retirement status 
(transitioning from being not retired to either partly 
or 
completely retired) and the change in hours (for 
those working at the previous wave). In both cases, we 
fail to find statistically significant differences across 
stock proxy groups. 
29An earlier version of this paper (Coile and Levine 
2004) reported the results of reduced form specifica 
tions much like those reported in Table 3. The results 
reported there do not support the hypothesis that 
there were higher (lower) rates of labor force re-entry 
during the bust (boom) for those groups with greater 
stock market exposure. In the CPS sample, we no 
longer report results separately for those with and 
without a pension, because only a small number of 
respondents in the labor force re-entry sample re 
ported this information. 


























































































































Notes: The sample of person-wave observations includes HRS Wave 1 respondents in all waves (from wave 2 to wave 6) in which they were between the ages 
of 55 and 70 (during the intra-wave year) and were not working at the previous wave. Participation in DC pension plan, IRA, or stocks is based on ownership 
of these assets at Wave 1; "high value" indicates Wave 1 assets of $50,000 or more (in 2003 dollars). Regressions also include controls for race, ethnicity, exact 
age dummy variables, marital status, gender, regional unemployment rates, and region-specific fixed effects. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) 
are 
multiplied by 100; standard errors are clustered at the household level to correct for arbitrary forms of serial correlation in the error term across individuals 
within the same household over time. 
Source: Authors' calculations from the Health and Retirement Study. 
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age rate of re-entry is 2.5% per year in the 
CPS and 8.0% per wave in the HRS.30 
Table 5 presents the results of this analy 
sis.31 We expect workers with greater expo 
sure to have been relatively less likely to re 
enter in response to an increase in the S&P 
500 Index. In fact, the opposite pattern is 
evident in both the HRS and CPS, and at 
least in the case of stock ownership, the 
differences are statistically significant. 
Thus, we are unable to find any evidence 
that retirees re-entered the labor force at a 
faster pace when the stock market dropped. 
Extensions 
We conduct a number of specification 
checks to assess the robustness of these 
results, focusing our discussion on models 
of retirement for simplicity. First, we con 
sider the argument that there is heteroge 
neity in workers' responsiveness to stock 
market fluctuations conditional on the level 
of stock holdings and that those workers 
who are most responsive retired during the 
boom and thus were not in the sample to 
delay retirement during the bust. This 
strikes us as a plausible hypothesis, but if it 
were correct, we would expect to see a 
bigger increase in retirement in the boom 
period for groups with greater market ex 
posure (as some of the workers in these 
groups would be the responsive ones who 
would choose to retire) than for groups 
with less market exposure. We do not 
observe this pattern. 
Second, we explore the hypothesis that 
younger workers were more responsive to 
30The discrepancy partly reflects the difference in 
survey periods, with two years between HRS waves 
versus one year for the CPS. Others have noted the 
relatively high rate of labor force re-entry in the HRS. 
For example, Bruce, Holtz-Eakin, and Quinn (2000) 
found that 15% of those who were out of the labor 
force in 1992 were employed or self-employed in 
1996. 
31In HRS analysis, the percentage change in the 
S&P 500 is the contemporaneous change across waves 
(for example, the change from January 2000 to Janu 
ary 2002 is used for labor force transitions between 
waves 5 and 6). 
stock market fluctuations, as might have 
been the case if their decisions were based 
more on finances while older workers' de 
cisions were based more on health status or 
social norms. To do so, we re-estimate the 
models separately for workers aged 55-59 
and 60-65. In both subsamples the pattern 
of boom and bust coefficients is inconsis 
tent with that predicted if the stock market 
had had an impact on retirement behavior. 
Third, we explore the effect of the mar 
ket on a worker's decision to work full-time 
or part-time. To do so, we re-estimate the 
model limiting the sample to those working 
full-time (35 or more hours per week) and 
define the dependent variable in one speci 
fication as moving to part-time work and in 
a second specification as either moving to 
part-time work or exiting the labor force 
completely. We find no evidence of a 
greater response to market fluctuations 
among those with greater market exposure 
in either of these alternative specifications. 
Finally, we perform two other checks. 
First, as labor supply is more difficult to 
measure for the self-employed than for 
other workers, we drop self-employed work 
ers from our 
analysis. The results are very 
similar to those found earlier. Second, to 
account for the possibility that some house 
holds experienced large increases in their 
housing wealth at the same time their stock 
portfolios fell, we include the change in 
real house value in the 
regression. We find 
that its coefficient is statistically insignifi 
cant and the coefficients on the boom and 
bust dummies are unaffected by its inclu 
sion. Overall, none of these extensions 
changes the nature of our earlier findings. 
Conclusions 
This paper has explored the impact of 
stock market fluctuations on retirement 
behavior. We take advantage of a unique 
double experiment that compares labor 
force exits for groups that were more and 
less exposed to those fluctuations to deter 
mine whether differences emerged during 
the recent boom and then reversed in the 
subsequent bust. Our focus is exclusively 
on the ability of the market to generate 
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changes in aggregate retirement behav 
ior, and not on the estimation of wealth 
effects for individuals. These two fea 
tures distinguish our work from that pre 
ceding it. 
The results of our analysis provide little 
support for an impact of market fluctua 
tions on retirement or labor force 
re-entry. 
This conclusion is based on the relatively 
small number of households with sizeable 
stock holdings, the magnitude of their re 
tirement response that would be required 
to generate the types of retirement pat 
terns observed recently, and our inability 
to find any evidence that population sub 
groups who should have been more re 
sponsive to market fluctuations were more 
responsive. 
Our results do not necessarily contradict 
previous studies that have found wealth 
effects associated with changes in the stock 
market or other unanticipated wealth 
shocks. On the contrary, it is almost cer 
tainly true that some individuals experi 
enced large drops in wealth because of the 
market bust and retired later as a result. 
But we suspect that this is a fairly narrow 
segment of the population. As we illustrate 
in our descriptive analysis, most workers 
have few if any stock assets; at the other end 
of the distribution, some workers may have 
sufficient wealth holdings that even a size 
able financial loss would not alter their 
retirement behavior. There is a group of 
workers in the middle whose retirement 
decisions are affected by stock market fluc 
tuations, but it is a sufficiently small group 
that we are unable to identify them in con 
ventional data sets. Thus it seems unlikely 
that even a substantial labor supply response 
by this group could be driving large changes 
in aggregate labor market trends. 
Despite our findings, stock market fluc 
tuations are likely to have broader implica 
tions for individuals' behavior and well 
being. Recent retirees, workers of near 
retirement age, and workers further from 
retirement all may respond in any number 
of ways, such as changing their level of 
consumption, altering savings and invest 
ment activities, updating expectations about 
leaving a bequest, or adjusting longer-term 
retirement plans or spousal labor supply 
(for younger workers). Indeed, there is 
some evidence to suggest that consump 
tion is sensitive to market fluctuations. Maki 
andPalumbo (2001) found that households 
increased consumption by 3.5 to 5 cents 
per year for each dollar of stock market 
wealth generated during the market boom 
of the 1990s, and Kezdi and Sevak (2004) 
obtained similar results for the bust period, 
with a somewhat larger response by retir 
ees. We conclude that changes in wealth 
brought about by market fluctuations may 
be reflected to a much greater extent in 
changes in consumption and possibly other 
behaviors than in changes in labor supply 
of 
near-retirement-age workers or recent 
retirees. 
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